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THE VAST DOMAIN OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS 
Vincent R. Johnson* 
INTRODUCTION: BROAD TERRITORY 
When I talk to foreign audiences, I often emphasize the fact that 
in the United States, unlike in many other countries,1 tort law is a 
large and dynamic field.  However, despite my pressing that point, 
listeners may fail to appreciate the broad scope and importance of 
this area of American law. 
That probably is not surprising.  The domain of American tort 
law is immense.  Everyday scores of courts in dozens of jurisdictions, 
hand down tort decisions on a nearly endless range of issues.  
Indeed, a large segment of the American legal profession makes its 
living, in whole or in part, by litigating torts. 
The tremendous territory covered by American tort law is 
suggested by the great amount of work still left to be done on the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts.  Work on the Restatement (Third) has 
been diligently underway for roughly twenty years, and much has 
been accomplished.  However, what I personally think of as the most 
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 1. For example, until recently China had no tort system.  See Vincent R. 
Johnson, Standardized Tests, Erroneous Scores, and Tort Liability, 38 RUTGERS 
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educationally valuable parts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
have not yet been touched by the work on the Restatement (Third). 
When I advise first-year law students, I recommend that they 
use the various Restatements to help them master the subjects in 
tort law that are either the most elementary or the most complex.  
The former group includes a number of “simple” intentional torts 
that are often front-loaded in basic law school torts courses: battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, and 
conversion.  The latter group encompasses several topics that, 
although vitally important, are so complex that they are commonly 
omitted from first-year torts classes and left to advanced law school 
courses.  These topics include misrepresentation, defamation, 
invasion of privacy, tortious interference, injurious falsehood, and 
nuisance. 
My advice to students reflects this line of reasoning: the 
Restatement sections dealing with the “simple” intentional torts are 
almost invariably clear, colorful, and easy to grasp.  Those parts of 
the Restatement help students to understand the interplay of 
general rules and exceptions, and nicely demonstrate how factual 
differences drive the application of the law.  In contrast, the 
Restatement sections dealing with the “advanced” subjects do a 
beautiful job of breaking complex subjects into manageable parts 
and allowing students to grapple effectively with extraordinarily 
challenging issues.  Those issues include, among others, questions 
dealing with tort liability related to the exercise of free speech 
rights, legal protection of privacy interests, commercial deception, 
and the limits of business competition. 
I.  A PRESSING TASK 
From my perspective, some of the most important and 
interesting work on the Restatement (Third) lies ahead.  That is the 
good news.  The bad news is that the task of completing the 
Restatement (Third) is becoming somewhat urgent.  In the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, students are routinely asked by 
professors to restate rules that they must regard as “ancient”—
sections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that were published in 
1965, 1977, and 1979.  Those provisions were promulgated long 
before many of today’s law students were born, and well before a 
host of modern technologies transformed modern life.  Fortunately, 
in the Restatement (Second), the “simple” and “advanced” areas of 
tort law have held up reasonably well.  Nevertheless, until work on 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts is complete, it is difficult for users 
of the Restatement to even determine the currently controlling rules.  
A law professor may know that volume two of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts is essentially obsolete and that volumes one, three, 
and four are still generally the latest word on the subjects they 
cover.  But law students, lawyers, and judges probably do not have 
that same advantage in terms of differentiating which parts of the 
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Restatement (Second) still survive. 
Moreover, there is a need to finish the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts before it is time to start the fourth.  It will not be long before it 
is necessary to restate the law of products liability, which was the 
first part of the work completed for the Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
II.  THE ROAD AHEAD 
It is reassuring that, as Professor Ellen Pryor explains in her 
article,2 the Restatement (Third) of Torts working group has rejected 
the idea of a “Restatement-light” patched together from the recent 
projects of the Restatement (Third)3 and many sections in the 
Restatement (Second) that have not been superseded.  Moreover, the 
working group’s list of the major topics that should be included in a 
fully integrated third Restatement does a good job charting the work 
that remains to be done by the American Law Institute (“ALI”).4  
That list includes: “Intentional Torts to Persons,” “Economic Torts,” 
“Torts Relating to Land and Water,” “Defamation and Privacy,” 
“Damages for Physical and Emotional Harm,” and perhaps other 
topics (such as complex malpractice issues).5 
Of course, it is possible to quibble with the working group’s list. 
The category called “Torts Relating to Interests in Land and Water” 
seems likely to include the law of public and private nuisance. 
However, treating nuisance actions as “torts relating to interests in 
land and water” seems destined to preempt any serious 
consideration of the recent judicial precedent holding that injuries 
related to mass-marketed products, such as handguns and lead 
paint, should be actionable as nuisances.6  Nevertheless, the 
categories identified by the working group offer a good starting point 
for dividing up the remaining work. 
 
 2. See Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and 
Continuation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2009). 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
 4. See Pryor, supra note 2, at 1389. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1214 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
victims of a shooting perpetrated by a man who purchased a gun illegally stated 
claims for public nuisance and negligence against manufacturers, distributors, 
and dealers of the firearms that were actually fired); City of Cincinnati v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002) (holding that a city 
stated a public nuisance claim against handgun manufacturers, trade 
associations, and a handgun distributor).  But see State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 
951 A.2d 428, 455–58 (R.I. 2008) (holding that a nuisance claim against lead-
based paint manufacturers should have been dismissed).  A federal law enacted 
in 2005 now bars a wide range of civil liability actions against manufacturers, 
importers, dealers, and other sellers of firearms and ammunition, including 
claims based on nuisance.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006).  But see Ileto v. 
Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowing claims against an 
unlicensed foreign manufacturer of firearms to proceed), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3320 (2010). 
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III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a law professor, I would like to offer these thoughts to those 
who will lead the efforts to bring the Restatement (Third) of Torts to 
a conclusion: 
First, the sections dealing with the simple intentional torts 
(battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, 
and conversion) should be revised in a way that retains the rich 
doctrinal complexity and clear illustrations that made the 
Restatement (Second) such a success.  Any effort to reduce the 
number of illustrations should be avoided.  Moreover, the drafters 
should strive for the same economy of expression that was 
characteristic of the illustrations in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.  Some of the ALI’s recent Restatements have included 
illustrations that, viewed from the standpoint of usefulness, are too 
few in number and too complex in structure.  Ideally, a lawyer, law 
student, or judge should be able to look over the illustrations in a 
Restatement section and quickly determine if he or she is on the 
right track in terms of understanding the law.  The illustrations 
should not be so nuanced, qualified, or uncertain in result that the 
only proper reaction from the reader is a quizzical expression and a 
furrowed brow. 
Second, when the sections dealing with the law of 
misrepresentation are revised, great care needs to be taken to clarify 
liability issues relating to indirectly disseminated false statements. 
This is the most difficult part of the law of fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation for a law professor to teach and for students to 
understand.  Case holdings, and the analyses offered in judicial 
opinions, also suggest that judges struggle with these principles.  In 
particular, the ALI needs to address important questions of liability 
related to false statements deliberately disseminated via mass 
media.  Some recent decisions have essentially reached the 
conclusion that it is permissible for financial and business 
institutions to intentionally mislead the public generally, so long as 
they are not aware of which particular investors will be defrauded.7  
These types of questionable decisions need to be scrutinized by the 
ALI.  On certain related points, such as liability for false statements 
contained in commercial documents8 or public filings,9 the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts charted an intelligent course.  
 
 7. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & 
“ERISA” Litig.), 490 F. Supp. 2d 784, 820–22 (S.D. Tex. 2007).  In Enron, the 
court declined to find that investors stated an action for fraud even though the 
main defendant, Merrill Lynch, had allegedly “cook[ed] its books” by devising 
fraudulent transactions to mislead investors and rating agencies, and had 
“issued through its analysts, even as Enron was descending into 
bankruptcy . . . ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ recommendations for Enron securities, 
which Merrill Lynch knew would be ‘widely disseminated in the financial news 
media.’”  Id. at 787. 
 8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 532 (1977). 
 9. Id. § 536. 
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However, some courts have rejected its teachings.10  The Reporters 
charged with the task of revising the misrepresentation sections of 
the Restatement should muster the precedent and policy arguments 
that will ensure that the law of fraud holds purposeful 
disseminators of false statements accountable for the harm they 
cause.11 
Third, in the field of defamation, there are several areas of the 
law that cry out for clarification: the distinctions between public and 
private figures,12 and between matters of public concern and matters 
of private concern; the murky subject of qualified privilege; the issue 
of whether persons suing with respect to matters of private concern 
must prove that the defendant acted with negligence (or some other 
degree of fault) regarding the falsity of a defamatory statement; the 
extent to which the traditional rules on libel and slander per se 
remain viable; and application of the single-publication rule to 
defamatory websites and other Internet communications.13 
Fourth, with respect to invasion of privacy, it is remarkable how 
well Dean William L. Prosser’s four privacy categories,14 articulated 
in the mid-twentieth century, have held up in the new Digital Age, 
when many invasion of privacy claims are based on electronic 
activities (e.g., the use of social networking websites and smart 
phones) that only recently have become possible.  However, the 
privacy sections of the Restatement (Second) are haphazard in their 
treatment of issues relating to culpability.  For example, the 
provisions on liability for appropriation of name or likeness do not 
address culpability.15  In contrast, the section on false-light invasion 
of privacy purports to require a degree of culpability that may no 
longer be consistent with current constitutional jurisprudence.16 
There are also unanswered questions about whether tort liability 
can be imposed, consistently with the First Amendment, for 
invasions of privacy based on truthful disclosure of facts.17  And 
 
 10. See, e.g., Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 
573, 582 (Tex. 2001) (declining to apply RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 536). 
 11. See, e.g., Andrew R. Simank, Comment, Deliberately Defrauding 
Investors: The Scope of Liability, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
 12. See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled 
Promise of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 
KY. L.J. 649, 671–94 (2007). 
 13. See Pendergrass v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 08–188, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99767, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2008) (declining to apply the single-
publication rule to limited dissemination of information). 
 14. See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 
387 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting the influence of William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960), and the similar analysis enshrined in RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977)). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 16. See West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tenn. 
2001) (rejecting the Restatement’s actual malice requirement “brought by 
private plaintiffs about matters of private concern”). 
 17. See Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 268–69, 372 S.E.2d 711, 716–17 (1988) 
(declining to recognize the private-facts tort because of its potential conflicts 
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important issues must be addressed relating to what types of 
dissemination of information constitute the kind of publicity that 
will serve as the basis for invasion of privacy liability.18 
Fifth, the Restatement (Second)’s treatment of tortious 
interference needs a top-to-bottom review.  Many courts have 
diverged from the path charted in this area by the Restatement 
(Second).  For example, a number of courts have rejected the second 
Restatement’s view that “burdening” contractual performance should 
be actionable.19 Additionally, other courts20 have articulated 
financial interest privileges broader than the one recognized in the 
Restatement (Second).21  Current American law regarding tortious 
interference is very unclear about whether a defendant’s “improper 
motive” is (1) a basis for liability separate from the use of “improper 
means,” (2) a factor which tips the balance in the assessment of 
whether conduct is unprivileged, or (3) simply irrelevant to issues of 
liability.22  The Restatement (Third) needs to grapple with and 
clarify the tangled mass of precedent that courts and lawyers now 
face in the field of tortious interference with contract and 
prospective advantage. 
Sixth, the Restatement (Second)’s provisions relating to 
malicious prosecution and related actions have always seemed too 
complex.  They need to be revised to clarify these difficult causes of 
action and their relationship to recent developments, such as the 
increasing use of anti-SLAPP laws.23 
Finally, the Restatement (Third) must chart a prudent course 
with respect to an issue that formed no significant part of the 
Restatement (Second), namely the recently recognized and much 
litigated “economic loss rule.”24  Court decisions addressing this 
subject are being issued so frequently that it may qualify as the 
 
with the First Amendment); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 
693 (Ind. 1997) (refusing to recognize disclosure actions due to conflict with the 
“truth-in-defense” provisions of the Indiana Constitution). 
 18. See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2009) (differentiating two types of publicity). 
 19. See, e.g., Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 616 (Wyo. 1989) (rejecting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979)). 
 20. See, e.g., RAN Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 649 (Alaska 1991) 
(recognizing a financial-interest privilege that protects more than investments). 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1979). 
 22. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH 
425–28 (2010) (discussing the role of motive in the law of tortious interference). 
 23. See LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 2009). LoBiondo 
involved a claim alleging malicious use of process.  It arose from a SLAPP 
(Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) defamation suit.  Under the 
law of many states, SLAPP actions are subject to early dismissal because of the 
protections afforded by the First Amendment to speech on public issues.  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court referred to the claim of malicious use of process as a 
“SLAPP-back suit.” 
 24. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the 
Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 524 n.1 (2009) (collecting 
examples of recent scholarship). 
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“hottest” topic in modern tort law.  As Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted, at “the current 
pace, the economic loss doctrine may consume much of tort law if 
left unchecked.”25 
IV.  TRACING THE BOUNDS OF THE REALM 
As these few points suggest, the Restatement (Third) of Torts is 
still far from finished, and this task may not be concluded for many 
years.  Perhaps this is what makes American tort law such an 
interesting field. 
The challenge of effectively restating the common law of torts 
has long been a great one.  However, the work facing the current 
generation of ALI scholars may be no more challenging than what 
was required in the past.  As a writer remarked almost a century 
ago about English contributions to Anglo-American law, it was at 
times “more difficult for jurists to state this branch of the law 
scientifically than for judges to make the law itself.  Writers on the 
law were like map-makers whose rulers conquer territory so rapidly 
that the bounds of their realms cannot be traced.”26 
Perhaps not much has changed in the vast domain of tort law. 
 
 
 25. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 181 (Wis. 2005) 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
 26. Percy H. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1927). 
